Can the structure of asset markets change the way monetary policy should be conducted? Following a linear-quadratic approach, the present paper addresses this question in a New Keynesian small open economy framework. Our results reveal that the configuration of asset markets significantly affects optimal monetary policy and the performance of standard policy rules. In particular, when comparing complete and incomplete markets, the ranking of policy rules is entirely reversed, and so are the policy prescriptions regarding the optimal level of exchange rate volatility. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.
Introduction
How does the structure of international asset markets a¤ect monetary policy? The debate surrounding optimal monetary policy in open economies has been extensive over the past decade. Many works have emphasized that optimal monetary policy in an open economy may be in ‡uenced the presence of a "terms of trade externality". Part of the literature highlights the fact that the presence of such an externality can a¤ect the optimality of inward looking policies. But are these policy incentives a¤ected by the degree of international risk sharing? The current paper characterizes a utility-based loss function for a small open economy under di¤erent asset market structures and derives the corresponding optimal monetary policy. Our analysis shows that the degree of risk sharing can signi…cantly a¤ect the optimal policy prescription and the performance of standard policy rules.
Early contributions on optimal monetary policymaking in an open economy, such as Clarida et al. (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) , show the policy problem in an open economy may be isomorphic to the one in a closed economy environment. Their results suggest that policymakers in an open economy should follow a purely inward looking policy, responding solely to movements in domestic prices (or producer prices). Hence, there is no role for exchange rate stabilization, even if movements in the exchange rate a¤ect consumer prices.
However, recent theoretical literature on policy objectives in open economies suggests that this result is not a robust one. As emphasized in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) , welfare in an open economy can be in ‡uenced by a "terms of trade externality". This externality arises because imported goods may not be perfect substitutes to goods produced domestically. This fact implies that a social planner in an open economy may wish to exploit a certain degree of monopoly power. 1 Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) analyze welfare and monetary policy in a setting characterized by this external distortion -related to the country's monopoly power in trade -and an internal distortion -related to monopolistic supply in the domestic market. The internal distortion implies that monetary surprises can increase output towards its e¢ cient level. But in open economies these surprises also reduce domestic consumers'purchasing power internationally. Because of the latter effect, expansionary policies can reduce welfare. As emphasized in Tille (2001) , the overall impact of such shocks depends on the relative size of these two distortions. 2 In a complete markets setting, Benigno and Benigno (2003) explore the consequences of such internal and external distortions for monetary policy cooperation in a stochastic two-country framework. De Paoli (2009) analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy setting. 3 These studies show that, if policymakers in di¤erent countries act independently, they may have an incentive to a¤ect the terms of trade in their own advantage. If domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes, an improvement in the terms of trade can induce agents to consume more imported goods (that is, terms of trade improvements have a so-called expenditure-switching e¤ect). These consumers are better o¤, since they can reduce their labor e¤ort without a corresponding fall in their consumption levels. A terms of trade improvement (or a real exchange rate appreciation) ceases to be welfare improving when these elasticities are small, and the terms of trade cannot divert consumption towards foreign goods. In this case, a more depreciated real exchange rate on average can be welfare improving. Moreover, unless countries are insular to terms of trade movements, domestic in ‡ation targeting is no longer the policy choice of individual countries.
The present paper evaluates whether or not the above policy incentives are in ‡uenced by the degree of international risk sharing. Our analysis con…rms that, under complete markets and a high elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign, there is a policy incentive to engineer a terms of trade improvement (or a real exchange rate ap-preciation). Moreover, in this case, a exchange rate peg can outperform (that is, lead to higher welfare) a policy that focus on domestic price stabilization. This is because a …xed exchange rate regime ties policymakers hands who, for this reason, under-stabilize output relative to the ‡exible price allocation. When compared with price stability, this regime is associated with a lower level of output and a more appreciated real exchange rate on average.
However, the results are di¤erent in the case of imperfect risk sharing. Whereas e¢ cient risk sharing severs the link between domestic consumption and domestic production, with incomplete markets these are more tightly related. Under …nancial autarky, for example, consumption has to be fully …nanced by domestic output. So, while in the complete markets setting, optimal risk sharing prevents home agents from su¤ering negative income e¤ects if they were to reduce domestic production and engineer a terms of trade improvement, this is no longer the case under incomplete markets. That is, under imperfect risk sharing it may no longer be possible to decrease agent's disutility from producing domestically without decreasing their utility from consumption. In fact, under incomplete markets, a policy of exchange rate stabilization would only be bene…cial if the degree of substitutability between home and foreign good is low. This is because a low elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods reduces the negative income e¤ect of terms of trade improvement on consumption.
Therefore, our welfare comparison highlights that while an exchange rate peg may outperform a domestic in ‡ation targeting regime when asset markets are complete and domestic and imported goods are substitutes, the opposite holds when asset markets are incomplete. Our results suggest that optimal monetary policymaking in a small open economy crucially depend on the degree of substitutability between goods and the degree of international risk sharing.
In terms of our modelling approach, we characterize a small open economy framework as a limiting case of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. The baseline framework features monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities and home bias in consumption. In our analysis we consider three di¤erent asset markets speci…cation: complete asset markets (optimal international risk sharing), incomplete asset markets (sub-optimal international risk sharing) and …nancial autarky (absence of international risk sharing).
Our policy evaluation methodology follows the linear quadratic approach developed by Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Sutherland (2002) , and characterizes a utility-based loss function for the di¤erent asset market settings. The method delivers an analytical representation of the policy problem that is similar to the one used in the traditional literature on monetary policy evaluation (that is, policymakers minimize a quadratic loss function subject to linear constraints). But the utility-based loss function for the small open economy depends not only on the volatility of output and domestic in ‡ation but also on the real exchange rate volatility. Moreover, the weights of these variables in the loss function depend on the form of asset markets. Finally, we derive the optimal monetary policy for the di¤erent settings and represent it in terms of a targeting rule à la Svensson (2003) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The system of log-linearized equilibrium conditions is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we derive welfare and Subsection 4.1 presents the linear-quadratic loss function. The analysis of monetary policy under di¤erent asset market structure is illustrated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Model
The framework consists of a small open economy setup derived from two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. The baseline framework is fairly standard, following the work of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009). Nevertheless, in our analysis, we consider three di¤erent asset market speci…cations. These are presented in Subsection 2.1.
In the model deviations from purchasing power parity arise from the existence of home bias in consumption. This bias depends on the degree of openness and the relative size of the economy. The speci…cation allows us to characterize the small open economy by taking the limit of the home economy size to zero. Prior to applying the limit, we derive the optimal equilibrium conditions for the general two-country model. After the limit is taken, the two countries, Home and Foreign, represent the small open economy and the rest of the world, respectively.
Monopolistic competition and sticky prices are introduced in order to address issues of monetary policy. We further assume that home price setting follows a Calvo-type contract, which introduces richer dynamic e¤ects of monetary policy than in a setup where prices are set one period in advance. Moreover, we abstract from monetary frictions by considering a cashless economy as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 2).
Preferences
We consider two countries, H (Home) and F (Foreign). The world economy is populated with a continuum of agents of unit mass, where the population in the segment [0; n) belongs to country H and the population in the segment (n; 1] belongs to country F . The utility function of a consumer j in country H is given by
Households obtain utility from consumption U (C j ) and contribute to the production of all domestic goods y j attaining disutility
Risk is pooled internally to the extent that agents participate in the production of all goods and receive an equal share of production revenue. Productivity shocks are denoted by s , and C is a C.E.S. (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregate of home and foreign goods, de…ned by
The parameter > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign-produced goods, C H and C F . As in Sutherland (2005) , the parameter determining home consumers'preferences for foreign goods, (1 v); is a function of the relative size 4 In the subsequent sections, we assume the following isoelastic functional forms: U (C t ) = 
1+
; where is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. of the foreign economy, (1 n), and of the degree of openness, ; more speci…cally,
Similar preferences are speci…ed for the rest of the world
with v = n . That is, foreign consumers' preferences for home goods depend on the relative size of the home economy and the degree of openness. Note that the speci…cation of v and v generates a home bias in consumption. The sub-indices C H (C H ) and C F (C F ) are Home (Foreign) consumption of the differentiated products produced in countries H and F . These are de…ned as follows
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated products. The consumption-based price indices that correspond to the above speci…cations of preferences are given by
and
where P H (P H ) is the price sub-index for home-produced goods expressed in the domestic (foreign) currency and P F (P F ) is the price sub-index for foreign produced goods expressed in the domestic (foreign) currency:
We assume that the law of one price holds, so
where the nominal exchange rate, S t ; denotes the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. Equations (6) and (7), together with condition (10), imply that P H = SP H and P F = SP F . However, as Equations (8) and (9) illustrate, the home bias speci…cation leads to deviations from purchasing power parity; that is, P 6 = SP For this reason, we de…ne the real exchange rate as Q SP P
:
From consumers'preferences, we can derive the total demand for a generic good h, produced in country H, and the demand for a good f; produced in country F
where G t and G t are the country-speci…c government shocks. We assume that the public sector in the Home (Foreign) economy only consumes Home (Foreign) goods and has preferences for di¤erentiated goods analogous to the ones of the private sector (given by Equations 4 and 5). The government budget constraints in the Home and Foreign economy are respectively given by
Fluctuations in proportional taxes, t ( t ), or government spending, G t (G t ), are exogenous and completely …nanced by lump-sum transfers, T r t (T r t ); made in the form of domestic (foreign) goods. Finally, to portray our small open economy, we use the de…nition of v and v and take the limit for n ! 0. Consequently, conditions (11) and (12) can be rewritten as
Equations (15) and (16) show that external changes in consumption a¤ect demand in the small open economy, but the opposite is not true. Moreover, movements in the real exchange rate do not a¤ect the rest of the world's demand.
Price-setting Mechanism
Prices follow a partial adjustment rule à la Calvo (1983) . Producers of di¤erentiated goods know the form of their individual demand functions (given by Equations (15) and (16)), and maximize pro…ts taking overall market prices and products as given. In each period a fraction, 2 [0; 1); of randomly chosen producers is not allowed to change the nominal price of the goods they produce. The remaining fraction of …rms, given by (1 ); chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected discounted value of pro…ts. The optimal choice of producers that can set their pricep t (j) at time T is, therefore
Monopolistic competition in production leads to a wedge between marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of production. We allow for ‡uctuations in this wedge by assuming a time-varying proportional tax t . Hereafter, we refer to these ‡uctuations as markup shocks M t , where M t = (1 t)( 1) . 5 Given the Calvo-type setup, the price index evolves according to the following law of motion,
The rest of the world has an analogous price setting mechanism.
Asset Markets
The structure of …nancial markets can signi…cantly alter the way idiosyncratic shocks a¤ect consumption, output and other macroeconomic variables. As described in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, Chapter 5), "The presence of international markets for risky assets weakens and may sever the link between shocks to a country's output or factor productivity and shocks to its resident's income. Sophisticated international …nancial markets thus force us to rethink the channels through which macroeconomic shocks impinge on the world economy."
In this Section, we introduce three di¤erent speci…cations for asset market structure. First, we present the scenario in which international …nancial markets are incomplete, by assuming that agents can internationally trade nominal riskless bonds subject to intermediation costs. Then we describe two benchmark cases of asset market structure: at one extreme, we analyze the case of …nancial autarky, in which the small open economy has no access to international …nancial markets; at the other, we examine the most developed form of capital markets, in which households have access to a complete set of contingent claims.
Incomplete Markets
We characterize the environment of incomplete markets by assuming that agents can trade nominal riskless bonds denominated in Home and Foreign currency. We consider that home-currency denominated bonds are only traded domestically. Moreover, following Turnovsky (1985) , the international trade of foreign currency-denominated bonds is subject to intermediation costs. 6 This cost is proportional to the country's aggregate net foreign asset position. If the small open economy is a net debtor, its agents pay a premium on the foreign interest rates when borrowing from abroad. On the other hand, if the country is a net creditor, households lending in foreign currency receive a rate of return lower than foreign interest rates. The spread is the remuneration of international intermediaries, and is assumed to be rebated equally among foreign households.
The intermediation cost assumption is introduced for technical reasons: it solves the stationarity problem in the style of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) . 7 By ensuring that the 5 Time-varying taxes introduce ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and goods production. We interpret them as markup shocks since, e¤ectively, changes in taxes are passes from …rms to consumers as changes in …rms'markup over their marginal cost. Note that we could have obtained the same source of disturbances if, for example, we had introduced a time-varying elasticity of substitution (as in Clarida et al (2002)), or a time-varying monopoly power of wage setters (as Woodford (2003)). 6 This speci…cation was also recently used in Benigno (2001 model is stationary, this assumption guarantees the precision of any quantitative exercises involving a log linear version of the model. In addition, it allows for the examination of the second moments of macroeconomic variables. Nevertheless, for some of our qualitative analysis, we consider the case of zero intermediation costs. This is done in order to simplify the analytical derivation of the optimal plan and improve our intuition on the policy prescriptions under incomplete markets. We can write the household's budget constraint at Home as follows:
where B H;t and B F;t denote domestic-currency and foreign-currency denominated nominal bonds and T r t are government transfers, made in the form of domestic goods. The function ( ) represents the cost from international borrowings and it is increasing in the aggregate level of foreign debt:
0 (:) < 0. We further assume a zero steady-state risk premium by setting B F = 1. Moreover, in specifying the budget constraint (19), we also assume that households in a given country produce all goods and share the revenues from production in equal proportions. So, given that idiosyncratic risk is pooled among domestic households, and foreign households only trade foreign-currency denominated bonds, domestic-currency denominated bonds are in zero net supply. That is, in reality only foreign-currency denominated bonds are traded in equilibrium. 8 As a result, de…ning the intermediation costs over the foreign currency bond only is su¢ cient to pin down the overall steady-state net foreign asset position.
We also consider the case in which the initial wealth of all households within a country are equal. In e¤ect, households in the same country face the same budget constraints in every period and state of the world. That is, we can consider a representative consumer for each economy. But even though idiosyncratic risk is pooled among households from the same country, there is imperfect risk sharing across borders.
Foreign households are assumed to trade only in foreign currency bonds. Thus, their budget constraint can be written as
The intermediation pro…ts K; which are shared equally among foreign households, can be written as
Given the above speci…cation, we can write the consumer's intertemporal optimal choices as
where Equation (22) results from the small open economy optimal choice of homecurrency denominated bonds. Equations (23) and (24) are Foreign and Home Euler equations derived from the optimal choice of foreign-currency denominated bonds. Moreover, Equations (22) and (24) imply that there is an interest rate di¤erential across countries.
Financial Autarky
In this setup, the economy does not have access to international borrowing or lending. Consequently, there is no risk sharing across borders. As in the case of incomplete markets, we assume that there is a symmetric initial distribution of wealth across domestic agents.
The household budget constraints, at Home and abroad, can be written as
Under …nancial autarky, the value of domestic production has to be equal to the level of public and private consumption in nominal terms. Aggregating private and public budget constraints, we have:
The inability to trade bonds with the rest of the world imposes that the value of imports should equal the value of exports:
Complete Markets
Following Chari et al (2002), the complete market environment is introduced by assuming that agents in the small open economy have access to state contingent claims that allow them to optimally share risk with the rest of the world. In particular, we assume that agents meet and trade state contingent …nancial assets before monetary policy decisions are made. In our setting, agents have access to a full set of claims, contingent on all possible states of nature (resulting from di¤erent realizations of shocks and policy decisions). Thus, in e¤ect, agents are insured against the uncertainty implied by the choice of monetary regime. This asset market structure implies the following risk sharing condition
But as shown in Senay and Sutherland (2007) , if one considers a setup in which asset are traded after policy takes place and individuals cannot insure against policy choices, the above condition no longer holds. Moreover, the authors show that the timing of asset trades can have signi…cant implication for policy analysis. In the current work we maintain the assumption that assets are traded before policy throughout the text, but we recognize that relaxing this assumption can have interesting implications for the analysis of monetary policy under alternative asset market structures. More speci…cally, if we assumed an alternative setting in which assets were traded after policy, we would be e¤ectively changing the level of insurance …nancial markets provide. So, this setting could lead to economic dynamics which are closer to the ones obtained under incomplete markets or …nancial autarky. 9 This fact could, in turn, reduce the di¤erences in the optimal policy prescriptions under alternative asset market speci…cations. We, nevertheless, leave the formal analysis of this speci…cation for future research.
Log-linearized equilibrium conditions
In the current Section we present a summary of the model's equilibrium conditions in logdeviations from steady state. In the previous section we present a general version of the model, while the log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions described below imposes some restrictions on parameter values and steady-state conditions. In particular, we assume a log-utility function (i.e. = 1). Moreover, we consider the case of a symmetric steady state which implies a zero steady-state net foreign asset position (that is, B F = 0, where upper-bar indicates a steady-state condition). The implication of these restrictions are discussed in Section 5.1.2, where such assumptions are relaxed.
The system of equilibrium conditions for the small open economy can be described by an aggregate supply, an aggregate demand and an equilibrium condition(s) implied by the …nancial market structure. These can be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3 , which represent, respectively, the case of complete markets, …nancial autarky and incomplete markets.
[Insert Table 1 Lower case variables are expressed in log deviations from steady-state, g t log(G t = Y ) and t log(M t ). In summary: c t and c t denote domestic and foreign consumption, y t denotes domestic output, q t denotes the real exchange rate, b t represents net foreign assets (expressed in real terms) and t represents domestic (or producer price) in ‡ation. The stochastic environment is characterized by the presence of productivity shocks " t , …scal shocks g t , and markup shocks t . The parameters of the model are described in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 about here] Equation (AS) represents the small open economy's Phillips curve. Note that the ‡exible price allocation is identical to the equilibrium allocation that would prevail were policymakers to target domestic in ‡ation. That is, the case in which ! 0 and, therefore, k ! 1; is equivalent to the case in which t = 0, rt. Equation (AD) illustrates how the demand for the small open economy's products depends on foreign and domestic consumption. Equation (CM) in Table 1 is derived from the complete market assumption, and represents the optimal risk sharing agreement between agents in the small economy and agents in the rest of the world. In Table 2 , which summarizes the equilibrium conditions under …nancial autarky, Equation (FA) represents the aggregate resource constraint. This Equation illustrates that under …nancial autarky, domestic consumption has to be fully …nanced by domestic production. Finally, in the case of market incompleteness (Table 3) , combining domestic and foreign Euler equations, we derive Equation (IM). Moreover, in this setup, the aggregate budget constraint of the small open economy can be written as (IM 0 ): Given domestic exogenous shocks " t , g t , and t , and external conditions, c t , the small open economy system of equilibrium conditions is closed by specifying the monetary policy rule. In the next sections we examine di¤erent speci…cations for this rule. Apart from analyzing the optimal monetary policy regime, we evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules such as an exchange rate peg, and both consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI) in ‡ation targeting regimes.
Foreign dynamics are governed by foreign supply and demand conditions (AS and AD ):
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The speci…cation of the foreign policy rule completes the system of equilibrium conditions which determine the evolution of y t ; c and t . For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the foreign economy targets domestic in ‡ation (i.e. sets
Welfare
In this Section we present the objective function and the optimal monetary policy plan for the small open economy, under the di¤erent asset market structures. We should note that, for clarity of the exposition, in the sections to follow we assume a speci…c level for this markup (in particular, we set M = (1 ) 1 , as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) ). This parameterization guarantees that the steady state is e¢ cient when the elasticity of intratemporal and intertemporal substitution are unitary, or when the economy is closed. We relax this assumption in Section 5.1.2.
In a microfounded model, welfare can be directly obtained from households'utility. Therefore, we obtain the monetary authority's objective function, which should re ‡ect the economy's level of welfare, from a second-order Taylor expansion of this utility:
The term t:i:p. stands for terms independent of policy (in particular, these refer to exogenous shocks that are not a¤ected by the policy choice) and O(jj jj 3 ) refers to terms of order strictly higher than two. In addition, we de…ne d t y t 1 (1 ) c t and y 0 t ( +1)
" t : Note that, in the case of a closed economy, in which = 0, the term d t is eliminated from the above expression. Moreover, when markup shocks are absent, y 0 t coincides with the ‡exible price allocation, or equivalently, the equilibrium allocation that would prevail if a policy of price stability is implemented. In other words, in this speci…cation of a closed economy, there is no trade-o¤ between stabilizing in ‡ation and the output gap.
But as described in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) , in an open economy welfare is in ‡uenced by an external distortion that gives rise to a terms of trade externality. Such a distortion arises because imported goods are not perfect substitutes to goods produced domestically, and, as a result, a social planner in an open economy may wish to exploit a certain degree of monopoly power. Thus, apart from nominal rigidities, welfare in our small open economy is a¤ected an internal monopolistic distortion as well as an external distortion. The presence of these distortions can be illustrated by the term d t in the loss function.
Importantly, the implication of these distortions depends on the asset market structure. We can illustrate this fact by comparing the complete markets speci…cation with the case of …nancial autarky. By inspection of Table 1 and Table 2 
11 Therefore, while a more appreciated real exchange rate on average is welfare improving under complete markets and substitute goods ( > 1), the opposite holds under …nancial autarky. 12 Under complete markets, when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility an real exchange rate appreciation can improve welfare by decreasing the disutility of producing at home without an equivalent reduction in the utility of consumption. But while the complete markets assumption prevents agents in the small economy from experiencing negative income e¤ects (were they to reduce their production levels), under …nancial autarky this would no longer be the case. When domestic agents have no access to international asset markets, domestic agents borrowing constraints imply a tight link between domestic consumption and income. In this case, if goods are substitutes an appreciated real exchange rate is actually welfare inferior, as it induces a lower demand for domestic goods and, thus, lower domestic income. Lower domestic income, in turn, decreases consumption and welfare.
On the other hand, when goods are complements in the utility (i.e. when < 1), under complete markets a more depreciated unconditional mean of the real exchange rate increases welfare by creating a rise in consumption utility larger than the rise in labor disutility. And, in this case, an appreciated exchange rate could improve welfare under …nancial autarky. For small values of , output would fall little relative the movement in 11 Using a …rst-order approximation of demand equation and the risk sharing condition, we can write d t as a function of and q t . However, the full welfare implications of the linear term can only be accessed when this term is approximated to second order. This is properly taken into account in the loss function derivation presented in the next Section. 12 In the case of log utility, when > 1 the marginal utility of consuming domestic goods increases with the consumption of foreign goods (and vice-versa). Thus, these goods are "substitutes in the utility". When < 1, domestic and foreign goods are "complements in the utility", as the marginal utility of consuming one good falls with the consumption of the other good. But in the general case of CRRA utility, this condition also depends on the coe¢ cient of risk aversion : In particular, goods are substitutes (complements) in the utility when > 1 ( < 1).
real exchange rate, and the e¤ect of the appreciation on agents'purchasing power would outweigh the reduction in output.
In the knife-edge case in which the marginal utility of consuming one good does not depend on the consumption of the other good (i.e. when = 1), welfare would not depend on the level of the real exchange rate. Under this speci…cation, the economy never experiences trade imbalances and the dynamics of the current account and the asset market structure are irrelevant. 13 As a result, the welfare characterization is also independent of the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, the real exchange rate externality is eliminated and the utility-based loss function becomes isomorphic to the one in a closed economy.
The Linear-quadratic Loss Function
In order to obtain an approximation of the optimal plan that is fully accurate to secondorder, we follow the linear-quadratic approach of Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Sutherland (2002) . 14 We eliminate the linear term d t in the Taylor expansion, using a second-order approximation of the model's equilibrium conditions. Because alternative asset market characterizations imply di¤erent equilibrium conditions, the …nal expression for welfare varies according to the structure of the asset market. The resulting objective function can be expressed as In what follows we let the superscript m = c represent the case of complete markets, while m = f a is the …nan-cial autarky setup and the incomplete market case is denoted by m = i. The vector of exogenous variables, e t ; is de…ned as:
Even though the weights in the loss function are a complex function of structural parameters, we can show that when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes (complements) in the utility function, in ‡ation variability is less (more) costly if asset markets are complete. In particular, the weight of in ‡ation in the loss function, l ; can be expressed as: 13 The irrelevance of the asset market structure under this speci…cation has been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Benigno (2001) , among others). 14 Chari et al. (1994 Chari et al. ( , 1995 suggest that the linear-quadratic approach may lead to an inaccurate approximation of the optimal policy problem. However, as explained in Benigno and Woodford (2006a, 2006b ), their analysis is based on a "naïve" linear-quadratic approximation of the policy problem. As emphasized by Judd (1996 Judd ( , 1999 , in order to obtain an approximation of the optimal plan that is fully accurate to second-order, the e¤ect of second moments on the mean of the variables should be taken into account. The linear-quadratic approach adopted in this paper incorporates these e¤ects by obtaining a purely quadratic approximation for the policy objective. Indeed, Benigno and Woodford (2006a, 2006b ) demonstrate that a purely quadratic representation of the loss function leads to the correct local approximation of the problem for small enough disturbances. 15 The second order approximation of the model and the full derivation of the loss function can be found in our Technical Appendix, which is available upon request. This appendix also contains a detailed derivation of the complete markets speci…cation and the full derivation of the optimal monetary plan.
where l = ( 1)(2 ). Therefore, l i = l f a > l c when > 1 and l i = l f a < l c when < 1.
Monetary Policy under Alternative Asset Market Structures
We proceed by characterizing the optimal plan under the assumption that policymakers can commit to maximizing the small open economy's welfare. The policy problem consists of minimizing the loss function given the equilibrium conditions and the initial conditions t 0 and y t 0 . 16 In the case of complete markets and …nancial autarky, the policymakers choose the path of f t ; y t ; c t ; q t g in order to minimize (31) , subject to the equilibrium conditions given by Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. The …rst order conditions to the minimization problem can be written in the form of the following targeting rules: 
where denotes …rst di¤erence operator, the superscript c denotes the complete market case and f a refers to the …nancial autarky setting. The above targeting rules set the objectives for monetary policy. This is done by specifying the targets y In the case of incomplete markets, the policy problem consists of choosing the path of f t ; y t ; c t ; q t ; b t g in order to minimize (31) subject to the equations speci…ed in Table 3 . The characterization of the optimal policy under incomplete markets is more complicated because of the intertemporal representation of the constraints (IM) and (IM 0 ). The presence of intermediation costs also adds to the complexity of the problem. Nevertheless, in the special case in which there are no intermediation costs involved in the international trade of bonds (i.e. = 0), the …rst order conditions of the policy problem imply
The general formulation of the optimal rule is similar under the di¤erent asset market structures. According to these rules, policymakers should respond to real exchange rate and output movements, as well as in ‡ation. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cients Q y ; Q q and Q vary with the structure of the asset market. Such coe¢ cients depend on the weights of output, the real exchange rate and in ‡ation in the loss function, which, in turn depend on the asset market structure.
However, as previously stated, when the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is unitary, the dynamics of the small open economy are independent of the asset market structure. Under this speci…cation, the …rst order conditions of the policy problem -for every asset market structure -can be expressed as:
where y 0 t coincides with the ‡exible price allocation for output when markup shocks are absent. Therefore, under this parameterization, a policy of complete domestic price stabilization closes the welfare relevant output gap. In other words, it is optimal to target producer price in ‡ation regardless of the asset market structure. This result would not hold in the presence of markup shocks, since, as emphasized in the closed economy literature, these shocks introduce ine¢ ciencies in the ‡exible price allocation. 18 
Evaluating monetary policy
After presenting the formulation of the optimal monetary policy analytically, we now evaluate the performance of optimal policy numerically. In particular, we examine how the degree of exchange rate and price stabilization prescribed by the optimal policy varies with the asset market speci…cation. Since the implementation of the optimal rule may not be straightforward in practice (either because the targets are di¢ cult to monitor -i.e. y T t and q T t depend on unobservable shocks -or because the weights are complex functions of structural parameters), we also evaluate the performances of simple policy rules. Table  6 presents the benchmark speci…cation for the parameter values used in our numerical exercises.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Figures 1-3 shows the response of output, real exchange rate, consumption and in‡ation following a productivity shock, for the di¤erent asset market structures. Impulse responses are shown for the case in which the monetary authority is following the optimal plan (darker lines) and the case in which the central bank is targeting domestic in ‡ation (lighter lines). In all cases, the increase in productivity leads to a higher output and a depreciation of the real exchange rate (as domestic goods become relatively cheaper in the face of higher supply). International risk sharing implies that consumption increases less then output. The di¤erence between output and consumption is larger under …nancial autarky, given that in this case risk sharing only occurs via international relative prices.
The plots demonstrate that, even though quantitatively optimal policy deviations from price stability are quite small, there are some interesting qualitative di¤erences. Under complete markets, relative to a policy of price stability, optimal monetary policy restricts movement in output and reduces the necessary movements in real exchange rate when goods are substitutes in the utility ( > 1). The opposite is true when goods are complements in the utility ( < 1). In this case, the level of exchange rate stabilization is higher than under price stability.
[Insert Figure 1 
about here]
The results are completely reversed when risk sharing is not optimal. Under incomplete markets or …nancial autarky, optimal policy reduces the volatility of the real exchange rate, relative to a policy that targets producer price in ‡ation, when goods are complements rather than substitutes in the utility. These …ndings are summarized in Table 7 , which compares the volatility of the real exchange rate under the optimal rule and under a policy of domestic price stability for the di¤erent asset market speci…cations.
[Insert Figure 2 about here] [Insert Figure 3 about here] [Insert Table 7 about here]
Understanding the results
The economic rationale for these results is similar to the one presented in Section 4. In this section we have seen that an appreciated real exchange rate on average can have a positive e¤ect on welfare when asset markets are complete and the elasticity of substitution is high or when asset markets are incomplete and this elasticity is low. So, in order to understand the results above, we need to spell out how stabilization policy a¤ects the average level of the real exchange rate. A second order approximation of the equilibrium conditions can provide an analytical solution of how the …rst moment (or the mean) of variables is a¤ected by the second moment (or the variance) of these variables. In e¤ect, these approximations can pin down the implications of policies with di¤erent degrees of in ‡ation and exchange rate volatility for the mean of the real exchange rate.
It follows that, regardless of the asset market structure, a policy that lowers the volatility of the real exchange rate at the expense of higher in ‡ation volatility tends to be associated with a lower level of output and a more appreciated real exchange rate on average. Why? One of the reasons is given by the fact that a less volatile real exchange rates tends to increase demand for imports relative to domestic goods. This link between demand and the variance of the real exchange rate can be seen by inspection of the second order approximations of the demand. But the de…nite link between stabilization policy and the average level of the real exchange rate, also depends on how the degree of exchange rate/in ‡ation volatility a¤ects the price index, supply and risk sharing conditions. Figure  4 illustrate this relationship numerically for the case of complete markets and …nancial autarky. It con…rms that the mean of the real exchange rate, E(q), falls (appreciates) when the central bank (following a rule of the type t + q t ) raises the degree of real exchange rate stabilization (i.e. increases).
[Insert Figure 4 about here] So, as Figure 1 demonstrates, when asset markets are complete and goods are substitutes, optimal policy over-stabilizes the real exchange rate relative to its ‡exible price allocation. A less volatile real exchange rate tends to increase demand for imports relative to domestic goods. In equilibrium, the small open economy experiences lower domestic demand, lower output and a more appreciated exchange rate on average. The policy e¤ectively diverts some output production to the foreign economy and therefore reduces the disutility of producing at home. At the same time, the complete market speci…cation ensures that consumption at home does not su¤er signi…cantly with the policy of diverting production.
Moreover, when domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes to each other, the decrease in output and production disutility will be larger and the welfare bene…ts for the real exchange rate stabilization policy higher. This reasoning explains why, as shown in Table 8 , when the elasticity of substitution between the goods is large enough, a policy that completely stabilize the nominal exchange rate a policy can outperform an in ‡ation targeting regime. But when goods are complements, however, it is no longer possible to shift consumption towards foreign goods by inducing a greater appreciation in the exchange rate. In this case, domestic in ‡ation targeting is the preferred policy rule [Insert Table 8 about here]
In the case of incomplete markets, there is a greater link between consumption and output. In the extreme case of …nancial autarky, for example, consumption has to be fully …nanced by domestic production. Consequently, a policy that tries to reduce the disutility of production will inevitably reduce consumption utility. When the elasticity of substitution between the goods is high, restricting the exchange rate movements (and engineering a more appreciated real exchange rate on average) has a strong impact on output and, consequently, on consumption. Therefore, it does not lead to welfare gains. In this case, as also illustrated Table 8 , a policy that focus on stabilizing in ‡ation and on minimizing the distortions that price dispersion brings, leads to higher welfare then a policy that perfectly stabilizes the nominal exchange rate.
On the other hand, lowering the degree of substitutability between the goods reduces output sensitivity to real exchange rate movements. Hence, the income e¤ect on consumption of the appreciation is smaller. In addition, a relatively appreciated exchange rate can improve the small open economy's purchasing power under market incompleteness (see equations (FA) and (IM)). When the elasticity of substitution between goods is su¢ ciently low, the income e¤ect in consumption is small and therefore its negative impact on welfare is smaller than the positive welfare e¤ect from an improvement in purchasing power. Hence, in this case, an exchange rate peg outperforms a domestic in ‡ation target.
Note that the …ndings presented in Tables 7 and 8 are entirely consistent with the results shown in Section 4.1. In this section we demonstrate that, when home and foreign goods are substitutes in utility, the coe¢ cient of in ‡ation variability in the loss function is smaller under perfect risk sharing than it is under incomplete markets, while the opposite holds when the goods are complementary to one another. The numerical value of these coe¢ cients are presented in Table 9 .
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Quantifying the results
In this section we aim at quantifying the signi…cance of the results presented above. In particular, we compare the welfare costs of di¤erent policy rules, conduct sensitivity analyses considering di¤erent parameter values, and evaluated the robustness of speci…c policy rules. 19 Moreover, we contrast the performance of domestic in ‡ation targeted with the optimal policy, and evaluate how signi…cant are the di¤erences in optimal policy across asset market structures. First, we examine the relative performance of simple policy rules under alternative asset market structures. In particular, we present the di¤erences in welfare, measured as percentage of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption, between a policy that targets domestic (or PPI) in ‡ation and one that follows a …xed exchange rate regime (or PEG). We do not show the performance of CPI targeting given that this policy is not the preferred one in any calibration considered. As in Table 8 , we consider values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ranging from 0.5 to 6. Although most of the recent literature tend to consider an elasticity of intratemporal substitution above unit, there is still some mixed evidence in the literature. For example, Rabanal and Tuesta (2006) Imbs and Mejean (2009) , suggests that evidence from disaggregated data points to estimates of around 5.
20
As Table 8 illustrates, when asset markets are complete, an exchange rate PEG can lead to higher welfare when the elasticity of substitution is signi…cantly high. But the quantitative results presented in Table 10 show that the di¤erences in welfare associated with a PPI relative to a PEG are of, at most, 0:02% of steady state consumption (this is the case when the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is set to 6). When risksharing is suboptimal, a PEG outperforms a PPI targeting regime when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low, and the di¤erence in welfare reaches 0:138% of steady state consumption when the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is 0:5.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
In our benchmark calibration, we consider a logarithm utility function -that is, we assume that the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, denoted by , is unitary. While this assumption is somewhat common in the real business cycle literature, the literature suggests a larger number for this coe¢ cient (for example, Chari at al (2002) consider a value as large as 6). Therefore, given that our welfare derivations assume a general constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, we can conduct further sensitivity analysis for higher values of the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. As shown in Table 11 , since increasing the degree of risk aversion raises the costs of economic ‡uctuations, it increases the welfare losses associated with inferior rules (that is, it raises the absolute values of the numbers presented in Table 11 ). 21 [Insert Table 11 about here]
As emphasized in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) , changing the degree of ine¢ ciency in steady-state output created by monopolistic competition can alter the design of monetary policy in closed economies. So our sensitivity analysis 20 See Bodenstein (2008) for a comprehensive discussion on this empirical literature. 21 As previously discussed, when utility is not log, goods are substitutes (complements) in the utility when > 1 ( < 1). But in the general case of CRRA utility, this condition also depends on : So changing the degree of risk aversion can also change the ranking of policy rules. For example, some further sensitivity tests suggest that if markets are complete and takes a value of 4 or 6; in contrast with the results of Table 8 , a PEG might outperform a PPI even if is as low as 2.
also considers di¤erent levels of steady-state markup . Table 11 illustrates that the welfare bene…t of restricting exchange rate movements tends to fall (and the relative performance of PPI relative to PEG tends to improve) with the level of steady state markup. This is because, a higher level of steady-state markup increases the size of the internal monopolistic distortion and the degree of ine¢ ciency in the level of output supplied by …rms. So, as in a closed economy, increasing raises the policy incentives to engineer a higher level of output as to o¤set the internal monopolistic distortion. As discussed in the open economy literature (see, for example, Tille (2001)), these incentives then counterbalance the ones coming from the presence of the external distortion. That is, the welfare gains from o¤setting the internal distortion counterbalance the bene…ts of inducing an equilibrium allocation in which the real exchange rate is more appreciated (and, in which, output would be lower). As a result, increasing reduces the net bene…ts from restricting exchange rate movements. Table 11 also examines the implications for the performance of policy rules of lower levels of the elasticity of labour supply, i.e. higher values of . Our benchmark calibration assumes = 0:47, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , but works such as Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2008) point to values as high as 6. Our results reveal that the relative performance of PPI increases with . The previous section highlights that a policy of restricting exchange rate movements (and switching consumption towards foreign goods) can improve welfare by reducing the disutility of producing domestically. But as labour becomes more inelastic, this e¤ect dissipates, and the performance of a policy that concentrates on domestic price stability improves. 22 Finally, as shown in Table 11 , reducing the degree of openness also decreases the incentive to exploit the terms of trade externality and improves the performance of an inward looking policy such as PPI relative to PEG. 23 The results above suggest that domestic in ‡ation targeting tends to outperform a PEG for most parameter values considered, unless the degree of substitutability between the goods takes values close to the bounds of the range considered. Moreover, the relative performance of PPI improves if we consider larger distortions in output due to monopolistic competition, less elastic labour supply, or lower degrees of openness. But how does domestic in ‡ation targeting performs relative to the optimal policy?
As previously illustrated in Figures 1-3 , although the optimal policy plan and a PPI in ‡ation targeting regime imply di¤erent levels of exchange rate stabilization, these policies lead to very similar economic dynamics following productivity shocks. In line with these results, Table 12 shows that the welfare costs of implementing a policy that targets PPI in ‡ation rather than the optimal policy are smaller than 0.0004% of steady-state consumption. So these …ndings generalize the results illustrated in Figures 1-3 , suggesting that PPI in ‡ation targeting lead to small welfare costs when the economy is subject to all types of shocks. 24 We should note, however, that the welfare losses presented in 22 This result is consistent with the …ndings of Cova and Søndergaard (2004) . 23 We have also conducted some sensitivity analysis varying the level of steady state net foreign assets in the case of incomplete markets. Nevertheless, these did not have notable implications for the ranking performance of di¤erent policy rules. 24 Note that Table 12 , as well as the other tables assessing the performance of di¤erent rules, assumes that the stochastic environment is characterized by the presence of all shocks. But the same qualitative results would hold if we rank policy rules conditional on the presence of only productivity shocks, only …scal shocks or only external shocks. Markup shocks e¤ectively introduce ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and goods production, so stabilizing such ‡uctuations is another objective of stabilization policy. Thus, the presence of such shocks tends to deteriorate the Tables 10-12 are of a similar order of magnitude as the costs of business cycles reported by Lucas (1987) , and are comparable to others found in similar exercises in the literature (see, for example Benigno (2009)).
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Our …nal exercise evaluates the welfare implications of designing policies under incorrect assumptions for level of asset market sophistication. For example, suppose that the small open economy is initially operating under …nancial autarky and the monetary authority is using the optimal policy designed for this asset market speci…cation. The economy then opens up to international asset trading, and nominal bonds become traded, but monetary policy remains the same. How big is the loss from not changing the optimal policy to take into account that agents can trades bonds? This is shown in the …rst column of Table 13 . The next column than compares the welfare costs of maintaining a policy designed for …nancial autarky, in an economy with access to a complete set of contingent claims. Finally, the …nal column analyze the opposite scenario. Again, the implications of adopting suboptimal policies for welfare are quantitatively small. This result is not surprising given that, under the calibrations considered in Table 13 , optimal policy resembles closely a policy of producer price in ‡ation targeting, regardless of the asset market structure. 25 [Insert Table 13 about here]
Concluding Remarks
In this work, we formalize the dynamics of the small open economy under di¤erent degrees of international risk sharing and show that these have direct implications for monetary policy. Optimal monetary policy is independent of the …nancial market structure only when the latter is entirely irrelevant for the economy's dynamics. This is the case when trade imbalances are ruled out and the steady-state level of net foreign assets is zero. Under this speci…cation, and provided there are no markup shocks or steady-state ine¢ -ciencies in output, domestic price stability coincides with the optimal plan, regardless of the degree of risk sharing. But in general the optimal level of stabilization of domestic prices or exchange rates varies with the asset market structure and the degree of substitutability between goods. When a country can optimally share risk with the rest of the world, and home and foreign goods are substitutes, restricting real exchange rate volatility may improve its welfare. But under imperfect risk sharing, these results are entirely reversed.
These …ndings suggest that countries with di¤erences import pro…les and di¤erent asset market characteristics could bene…t from di¤erent policy speci…cations. Having said that, our results suggest that, although qualitatively interesting, the quantitative implications of these factors for the performance of di¤erent policies are not large. In particular, our numerical results suggest that welfare costs of adopting a domestic in ‡ation targeting appear to be small for most parameter values considered. But, as underlined in Lucas (1987) , small welfare costs of macroeconomic ‡uctuations appear to be a feature of most models of this class.
performance of simple rules relative to the optimal policy. 25 We do not present quantitative assessments of the optimal rule for extreme values of because, in these cases, the second order conditions of the optimal policy problem may not be satis…ed. Table 8 : Welfare ranking of producer price in ‡ation (PPI) targeting, consumer price in ‡ation (CPI) targeting and …xed exchange rate regime (or PEG), when the economy is subject to productivity, markup, …scal and external shocks. 
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